
Frameworks, core principles and top case studies for SaaS pricing, learnt and refined over 28+ years of SaaS-monetization experience.
Thank you! Your submission has been received!
Oops! Something went wrong while submitting the form.
SaaS Pricing
Just as tariffs between major trading partners (like U.S. import taxes on Chinese goods) alter trade flows and squeeze margins, price wars in software can similarly distort market dynamics. Tariffs raise costs and force exporters to cut prices or absorb costs. In the 2018-2019 U.S., China trade war, many manufacturers saw higher input costs and “lower profit margins” as a result. Likewise, when software companies undercut each other’s prices or bundle services for free, it creates ripple effects: margin compression, commoditization of offerings, and even market restructuring. In essence, a price war is the tech industry’s version of a trade tariff, an economic shock that forces everyone to adapt.
When one player slashes prices or adds a product “free” (similar to a tariff altering a trade’s cost basis), competitors often retaliate. The short-term beneficiary is usually the customer (lower prices), but the long-term effects can be complex:
Below, we explore how history is rife with these “tariff-like” price wars in software – from early cloud computing battles to today’s AI and SaaS tool skirmishes, and what strategic lessons they hold.
Cloud storage prices plummeted in the early 2010s as AWS, Google, and Azure engaged in repeated price cuts (per GB per month costs fell by 80%+), before stabilizing in late 2010s.
One of the first major software price wars unfolded in cloud computing.
In the early 2010s, Amazon Web Services (AWS) and its new rivals (notably Google Cloud Platform and Microsoft Azure) entered a “race to the bottom” on pricing. AWS had a strategy of continual price reductions, over 100 price cuts since launching in 2006, to pass on its economies of scale to customers and undercut competitors. This was not a one-sided effort; Google and Microsoft responded in kind.
Notably, between 2010 and 2014, Google slashed its cloud storage prices by 85% while AWS dropped S3 storage prices by a similar 84%.
These rapid, tit-for-tat price changes mirrored a trade tariff battle, with each player willing to sacrifice per-unit revenue in exchange for market dominance.
The outcome was profoundly deflationary for computing costs. Renting servers or storing data became dramatically cheaper, by an order of magnitude within a few years. For example:
For customers, this was a windfall. Startups gained access to world-class infrastructure at a fraction of earlier costs, catalyzing a generation of cloud-native innovation. For cloud providers, however, it was a margin-squeezing struggle for share, one that only the largest platforms could survive. Like prolonged trade wars, the pricing battle weeded out smaller competitors and concentrated power in the hands of a few.
By the late 2010s, the most dramatic price reductions had slowed. The core prices for compute and storage stabilized post-2017, and vendors shifted tactics:
The cloud price war shows that deflationary pricing can “reset” an entire industry’s cost structure, creating a new normal. Any new entrant now must match the low price expectations or offer clear extra value. For customers it was a boon, but for providers it was a long fight for market share, one that only the largest players survived, which is exactly how protracted trade wars often play out as well.
Another classic price war played out in the mid-2010s between Slack and Microsoft teams.
Slack, launched in 2013, grew rapidly thanks to its innovative chat platform and a freemium model, free for basic use, then paid tiers per user. By 2017, Slack was a breakout success, widely adopted by startups and tech-forward enterprises.
Microsoft took notice and responded, not by building a superior product or competing on price directly, but by bundling Teams into its Office 365 suite at no additional cost. This was the software equivalent of a tariff tactic: Microsoft used its Office monopoly to distribute Teams “for free” to millions of businesses, effectively undercutting Slack’s standalone pricing model.
The impact was immediate and sweeping:
This bundling, combined with Microsoft’s massive distribution reach, made Teams the default for Office customers, a huge pricing advantage. For many cost-conscious companies, even those that preferred Slack’s user experience, it was hard to justify paying $6-8 per user per month for Slack when Teams came bundled with software they were already paying for. Small and mid-sized businesses began switching en masse, seeing Microsoft’s bundle as “better value for money.”
Slack fought back by doubling down on product quality and differentiation, but it was an uphill battle. In 2020, Slack filed an antitrust complaint arguing that Microsoft’s tying of Teams with Office was anti-competitive. Regulators in the EU later echoed this, stating that the bundling gave Teams an unfair “distribution advantage” over rivals.
But regardless of the legal outcomes, the damage was already done. This bundling-based price war forced Slack into a defensive position, ultimately contributing to its decision to sell to Salesforce rather than continue as an independent company.
It’s a vivid example of how pricing strategy, specifically zero pricing via bundling, can reshape a market. A once-dominant startup was effectively absorbed, and customer expectations shifted: collaboration tools were now expected to come “free” as part of larger suites.
Much like a tariff in a global trade war, Microsoft’s bundling made it economically untenable for customers to choose a standalone alternative, even one they loved.
When a novel software category matures, commoditization and price-based competition are almost inevitable. Electronic signatures are a case in point.
DocuSign, a pioneer in e-signature software, initially enjoyed years of growth with a usage-based pricing model (charging per envelope/document signed). This worked well when the technology was new and clearly saved money for customers. But by the late 2010s, e-signatures had become table stakes, many competitors emerged offering similar functionality, often cheaper or even bundled into broader offerings. DocuSign’s edge eroded as “competitors like Adobe Sign and HelloSign (Dropbox) offered similar capabilities, sometimes at lower price points or as part of broader service offerings.” In other words, basic e-sign became a commodity.
DocuSign faced two big challenges due to this price war dynamic:
Instead of joining the race to the bottom, DocuSign made a strategic pricing pivot:
This approach reframed DocuSign as a premium solution, not just a digital paperwork tool.
Importantly, the company didn’t abandon usage pricing entirely. It:
This allowed DocuSign to preserve flexibility and transition customers at their own pace.
This pricing evolution achieved several goals:
The e-signature saga, which is documented in Price to Scale Vol2, shows that when a product becomes commoditized, the answer isn’t always to slash prices, it can be to change the pricing model entirely.
They aligned pricing with customer segmentation:
This is similar to how a country facing tariff pressure might move upmarket to higher-value exports, rather than compete purely on price.
By adapting its pricing strategy, DocuSign weathered the commoditization wave, at a time when "everyone and their brother" had an e-sign product.
Email marketing tools have also seen their share of price-driven competition over the past decade. Mailchimp is a prime example. In the early 2010s, Mailchimp’s bold use of a freemium model (allowing substantial use of the product for free) was akin to a unilateral tariff cut, it dramatically lowered the cost barrier for small businesses to start email marketing.
By 2019:
However, as Mailchimp gained dominance (and was acquired by Intuit in 2021), it began pulling back on free usage, effectively imposing a tariff after years of free trade. In early 2022, Mailchimp announced it was severely limiting its free tier: the contact limit was slashed from 2,000 down to 500 (a 75% reduction).
Shortly after, they also halved the monthly email sends allowed on free plans (from 2,500 to 1,000).
At the same time, prices on paid plans went up for many tiers. By early 2023, the generous “Forever Free” era was over, many users now had to either upgrade to paid plans (e.g. ~$10/month for a few hundred contacts, scaling to hundreds of dollars for larger lists) or leave the platform. As one analysis noted, within about 12 months Mailchimp’s changes meant “what was free in 2021 would now cost around $400 per year” for the same usage.
This about-face created opportunity for rivals.
Sensing user frustration, competitors moved swiftly:
The result: the category came full circle.
Mailchimp’s journey is a case study in pricing lifecycle dynamics:
Key takeaway: Pricing power isn’t permanent. Freemium gets you share, but sustainable growth demands a shift, from free to feature-rich, value-based monetization.
Over the past two years, Generative AI has emerged as the latest theater for aggressive pricing battles. What began with breakthrough, high-priced AI APIs, like OpenAI’s GPT-4 at launch, quickly escalated into a full-blown price war between tech giants and startups, especially through 2023–2024.
This played out almost like a textbook trade war in reverse: instead of protective tariffs or price hikes, we saw a relentless sequence of price cuts. Each provider raced to undercut the other in a bid to capture a surge in demand for AI capabilities.
OpenAI led the charge with dramatic reductions:
These are staggering price drops over just a few months, making cutting-edge AI dramatically more affordable, and setting a new bar for competitors.
The rest of the market responded swiftly:
This created a market dynamic with a “race to the bottom” feel, where players wield either massive capital reserves or bundling strategies to drive prices as close to zero as possible. The goal isn’t just to sell APIs, it’s to win users and lock in enterprise contracts.
The short-term impact of this GenAI price war is unambiguous:
In effect, AI has been democratized, if not outright commoditized.
But there’s a growing downside to this relentless price competition. Just as zero tariffs can flood markets with cheap imports and destroy domestic industries, ultra-low-cost AI from a handful of dominant providers could destabilize the broader ecosystem.
Analysts are already warning about the implications:
The result? A flattening of the innovation curve and a flood of generic offerings that do little more than wrap commoditized models in new UI.
Beyond product innovation, the broader market structure itself is under threat.
If only the biggest cloud players, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, can afford to deliver generative AI at near-zero margins, we risk ending up with just a few dominant “AI utilities.” These firms would effectively control the supply chain, creating:
The generative AI pricing free-for-all of 2023–2025 is a live case study in the double-edged nature of price wars:
The critical challenge, and opportunity, will be this: Which companies can leverage low pricing as a strategic growth lever, without permanently destroying their ability to monetize differentiated value in the future?
Looking across examples in cloud infrastructure, collaboration software, e-signatures, email marketing, and now generative AI, a clear theme emerges: pricing is a powerful weapon, but also a double-edged sword.
Too often, companies treat pricing changes as reactive maneuvers or one-off tactics, rather than the strategic growth lever it truly is. In reality, pricing should never be an afterthought, it directly shapes enterprise value and market positioning.
Simply put: “Pricing strategy isn’t just about revenue, it’s a crucial lever for growth,”
and it must evolve thoughtfully as your market matures.
In our view, the companies that win price battles aren’t those that slash prices indiscriminately. They’re the ones who align their entire monetization strategy, segmentation, packaging, pricing metrics, rate setting and operations, to deliver superior value.
Here’s how software leaders can apply that mindset:
Key takeaway: Compete where it makes strategic sense, and protect the perception of value elsewhere.
Key takeaway: Pricing should serve strategic goals, not be dictated by your competitors’ moves.
Key takeaway: Resist the urge to follow competitors into pricing traps, defend value to preserve long-term margins.
In Conclusion,
Price wars in software and services function a lot like tariffs in global trade: They can protect or grow market share in the short term, but they also reshape the competitive landscape.
The companies that navigate them best:
History repeats itself: SaaS companies that react impulsively by cutting prices often fade away, while those who compete on value and use pricing to reinforce that value emerge stronger.
At Monetizely, we advise treating pricing as a core part of your growth strategy. When handled right, you can win on pricing and build long-term value, turning a potential price war into a springboard for durable, strategic growth.
Join companies like Zoom, DocuSign, and Twilio using our systematic pricing approach to increase revenue by 12-40% year-over-year.